Thu Apr 4 14:27:31 1996
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From: Maurice Robinson
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Subject: Re: autographs and archetypes
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[long -- part 1 of 2]
On Mon, 1 Apr 1996, James R. Adair wrote:
I'm just trying to examine a few presuppositions, in
order to see how they affect the resulting positions we take.
>> it is only a peculiarly biased viewpoint which would not
>> think the abundance of evidence would bring us closer to . . .
>> that goal.
>Abundance of evidence is certainly preferable to paucity of evidence.
>I would agree that it's possible to get closer to the original with
>more evidence, but as we approach the "100% original" limit, the
>diversity of the evidence shows us that this limit cannot really be
>reached.
I agree with this statement, worded as it is; I differ only regarding
the previous claim that, in spite of the amount of evidence we possess,
conjecture cannot be ruled out as the ultimate solution in certain
variant units.
Even within a Byzantine-priority method there still remain numerous
variant units where the external data are divided and the text
basically becomes established by internal evidence. In those cases
(especially in the book of Revelation), no claim of 100% certainty can
be made, and I obviously do not in my own edition, nor do Hodges and
Farstad in their edition.
>> re: Hort's "primitive corruptions"
>> There seems to be a presumption of non-authenticity. . . .
>> Why not a presumption that, unless . . . inauthenticity can be
>> _proven_, the text should be considered basically "authentic" . . .
> There is no presumption of non-authenticity. My presumption is
> non-certainty.
Your term is more precise, and I accept the semantic correction.
However, at whatever point you invoke the non-certainty principle in
favor of conjecture, non-authenticity is being proclaimed regardless.
I too have a non-certainty principle, as mentioned above, yet I rule
out conjecture altogether, due to the quantity of evidence we possess.
Under your principle, conjecture can _never_ be ruled out, and could in
theory be applied to any known variant unit where decisions or
interpretation are difficult, or even to difficult readings in places
where NO textual variation occurs at all, e.g. the "Enoch" conjecture
in 1Pet.3:19 which has been mentioned.
I simply consider it illegitimate to presume the "non-certainty"
principle as an initial factor which then allows a departure from the
evidence whenever the whim of conjecture may happen to strike the
interpreter.
Of course, neither the "Enoch" nor any other conjecture was printed as
the main text in any Greek NT edition until UBS3/N26 conjectured their
reading of Ac.16:12 -- and even this must have been embarrassing, since
some stray vulgate MSS have now been found which are cited to "justify"
that conjecture in N27 (Erasmus and the Johannine Comma incident should
not be forgotten when such occurs -- at least the Comma had some
limited _Greek_ evidence).
>Textual critics can only work with the data they have, and NT text
>critics certainly do have good data in comparison with, say,
>classical text critics, but assuming that the reading of the autograph
>has been preserved in _every_ case is quite a presumption.
If the number of extant MSS, versions, and fathers were but 10, there
would certainly be a great potential for conjecture. If the number of
extant witnesses increased to 100, the potential would be significantly
reduced. If statistical theory is now applied to the entire the
quantity of data we currently posses, I doubt that any statistician
would suggest a theoretical degree of error more than about 1/10000 of
a percent. If so, then simply rejecting conjecture as a legitimate
methodology is hardly "quite a presumption" -- note also that the issue
of "100% certainty" is _not_ being claimed merely because conjecture
has been properly ejected from the text-critical toolbox.
>If I had said that primitive corruption
>is definitely behind certain readings in our NT text, this would be a
>faith presumption. To say that we cannot be certain that _every_
>autograph reading is preserved in one or more extant witnesses is a
>statement of caution.
The presumption of possible primitive corruption which transcends our
extant evidence is still a presupposition based on a faith (or doubt)
assumption. There are limits beyond which caution turns into paranoia,
and I think that conjecture in the face of massive extant evidence
simply crosses that line.
> It might not even be too much to say, from a
>purely logical standpoint, that it is a statement of fact, which could
>only be disproved if we had all of the autographs.
Of course, as others have mentioned, even if we did discover them, how
would we know? On the other hand, had the autographs been preserved
from their original era, then textual criticism would no longer be
needed. A vicious hypothetical circle from which postulating
conjectures is the only escape? I think not.
>>Only some NT textual critics make a place for conjecture within the
>>text of the NT. Most handbooks rule such a practice out entirely.
>I don't deny that many, maybe most (I haven't checked all of them),
>handbooks rule out conjecture; certainly all caution against its
>overuse. But let me quote Metzger, _The Text of the New Testament_:
> "One must admit the theoretical legitimacy of applying to the New
> Testament a process which has so often been found essential in the
> restoration of the right text in classical authors.
Granted in theory, but Metzger immediately counters this theoretical
presumption by appealing to the quantity of evidence which, even in
his opinion, basically rules out conjecture as a working principle for
NT textual criticism.
> ... the amount of evidence for the text of the New Testament, ...
> is so much greater than that available for any
> classical author that the necessity of resorting to emendation is
> reduced to the smallest dimensions.
> It is perhaps chiefly in the
> Catholic Epistles and the Apocalypse, where the early manuscript
> evidence is more limited than for any other part of the New
> Testament, that the need for attempting conjectural emendation may
> arise with any degree of urgency" (p. 185).
Metzger is correct that in those particular books we have less data
than in the remainder of the NT. He still hedges with "perhaps",
however, and I would still urge that the quantity of evidence preserved
even in the Apocalypse (with around 275 MSS, a few versions, and a few
fathers) is wholly sufficient by which to establish the text without
having a need to appeal to conjecture. Again, I would urge a
statistician to calculate the likelihood of error existing in over 300
Greek MSS of the Apocalypse with at least three competing types of text
(Andreas, Q, and Egyptian) existing. I suspect even here about 1/1000
of a percent likelihood of error.
> Again, I am _not_
> advocating wholesale emendation of the text; I am only saying that
> emendation cannot be theoretically ruled out as a tool of the
> textual critic.
Granting the above in theory, is there any place in _practice_ where
you are convinced that all extant witnesses are corrupt and conjecture
is needed to resolve the difficulty? Ac.16:12 of course immediately
springs to mind, since UBS3/4 and N26/27 have adopted the conjecture
there -- but is even that case necessary in your opinion? And if so,
what other places would you maintain are hopelessly corrupt in our
extant data?
>> Further, as mentioned above, if primitive error can be suspected in _some_
>> places where variation occurs, what is there to prevent suspicion of
>> primitive error even in places where _no_ variation occurs? There is no
>> legitimate boundary which restricts such a presupposition from being
>> applied anywhere once one does not happen to agree with or understand the
>> text.
>This is the famous "slippery slope" argument, popularly used by many
>people on all sides of many debates, but logically of no value to the
>argument.
But this is precisely what _did_ occur in the case of the "Enoch"
reading in 1Pet., and, if all the conjectures noted in the various
critical editions are listed, I will suspect that the majority of them
in fact occur in places where there is _no_ substantial textual
variation -- no "slippery slope" there; rather, a willingness to
presume "primitive error" even in places where no variant readings
exist.
>the real questions is whether other scholars will agree with their
>assessment.
Which, except for the Ac.16:12 matter, has not occurred in the printed
Greek NT editions as regards their main text.
>All in all,
>I doubt that admitting that conjecture is a legitimate tool of the NT
>textual critic will lead to a stampede of new emendations in future
>critical editions of the text.
I definitely agree with this statement; however, I still do not think
the door needs to be opened even a crack here. There simply is too
much data with which to work.
_________________________________________________________________________
Maurice A. Robinson, Ph.D. Assoc. Prof./Greek and New Testament
Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary Wake Forest, North Carolina
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