Subject: The Original Text

From: "Mirkovic, Alexander" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 1997 01:45:37 -0500 (EST)

Dear List,

It has been a real pleasure to read all your comments and 
discussions. In light of  the recent discussion on the 
"original text" I've decided to write something of my own. 
I am a Ph. D. student at Vanderbilt in New Testament with a 
strong interest, aside from my major area, in Classical 
Studies. My interests are in Johannine studies and Gospel 
studies in general, Gnosticism, Hellenistic Literature, 
Religion, and Culture, and, of course, Greek language and 
textual criticism.
	Following on the previous discussion, I believe 
that it is not wise to make a very sharp distinction 
between literary and textual criticism. John is a good 
example, as well as, Romans, Mark, etc. John 7:53-11 is not 
part of many manuscripts. Is it a part of the "original 
text?" The dilemma is: to print it, or not to print it? NA 
is wise in this regard, because it chooses to put it in 
brackets. The same holds for the endings of Mark. The 
interpretation changes, if these passages are included and 
it changes substantially. It is necessary to have all the 
available data in front of us and read the text in many 
possible ways. If it is in the manuscript tradition, 
somebody thought that this is meaningful. We have to have 
the opportunity to cut both ways!
	Some post-modern theory (deconstruction) might be 
useful here. There is no original text! Every text is 
"intertextual." Think of Derrida and the idea of 
logocentrism! Authorial intention (a logocentric idea) and 
the "original text" are connected: they are our 
idealizations. Writing dissertations and academic papers 
comes to mind. When I write, I usually have several 
versions in the computer. Which one is the "original 
version." Probably, the one that I have submitted. This 
means that the "original text" is "proclaimed" by an 
outside authority, not the author. New Testament texts are 
products of their authors and their readers, early 
Christians. Early Christian communities have decided for us 
which are the "original texts," but they have also 
produced many "original texts." I write in plural, because 
all of the variants were "original" for somebody, 
somewhere, at some point in time. Reception of the text is 
as much important as the author. What was the "original 
text" of John for one community, must not have been the 
"original" for another community.
	Therefore, I would define TC as a study of the 
manuscript tradition which aims to establish relationships 
between variant readings. If the study shows that all the 
variant stem from one single manuscript, that is fine. 
But this is not the "original,"  just the earliest version 
available. I am not an "eclectic" and I am for 
constructing the stem for the manuscripts if this is 
possible, but we should be aware that the stem speaks more 
about relationships, than about the "original."

I wish that we could deconstruct this cold weather as well!
Greetings!
Alexander

*************************************************
Alexander Mirkovic
Senior Teaching Fellow for Koine Greek
Vanderbilt University
Graduate Department of Religion
Email: [email-masked]
Phone: (615) 421-8331
*************************************************

---

From: "Professor L.W. Hurtado" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 1997 09:38:38 +000

With regard the "original text" question being dicussed, one of our 
list wrote:

> outside authority, not the author. 

I think we'd all better take a deep breath, count to 10, and be 
*very* careful before we follow Derrida, et al. down that 
"deconstructionist" road.  There lies madness!  The very example our 
writer cites shows this:  If *he* chooses which version of his paper 
to submit, then it is *he* who has decided which to make public, thus 
making it the "official" version--not some other authority.

   >New 
Testament texts are 
> produced many "original texts."
Yes, of course, if the question is which books became canonical, and 
which versions of these books were circulated at any point among 
Christians as the text of this or that book, then many more than the 
original author were involved--copyists, readers, etc.  But none of 
these data in any way logically or historically falsifies the fact 
that each book was written before it was copied, or modified, or 
edited.  And the person(s) who wrote the text was/were the "author", 
with real *authorial intentions*, however much the transmission and 
reading process makes it difficult for such intentions to come to 
realization clearly.  The communication process is complicated, to be 
sure, whether in writing or oral speech, but this in no way justifies 
the "postmodernist" disdain of the genuine human process involved in 
communication--which properly involves *two* principals, not just 
one:  *both* the speaker/writer and the hearer/reader.  Radical 
postmodernist views of texts/communication does to the process what 
auto-eroticism is to real sex, reducing it to readers playing with 
themselves instead of the much more exciting adventure of exploring 
and getting to enjoy another!

Now, can we get on/back to textual criticism and other historical 
questions that are not the anti-human/humane dead-ends that 
deconstructionism represents?

L. W. Hurtado
University of Edinburgh,
New College
Mound Place 
Edinburgh, Scotland EH1 2LX
Phone: 0131-650-8920
Fax: 0131-650-6579
E-mail:  [email-masked]

---

From: [email-masked] (Ulrich Schmid)
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 97 14:44:53 +0100

On Mon, 20 Jan 1997, Alexander Mirkovic wrote (inter alia):

>John is a good 
>part of many manuscripts.

Quite to the contrary, John 7,53-8,11 is part of the overwelming majority of 
MSS.

Ulrich Schmid, Muenster

---

From: "Robert B. Waltz" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 1997 08:47:18 -0700

On Mon, 20 Jan 1997, "Mirkovic, Alexander" <[email-masked]>
wrote:

[ ... ]

Let me second Hurtado's comment in response to this letter: We need to
take a deep breath before responding. But, having done that, and read
the rest of my mail, I *still* feel the need to respond.

>between literary and textual criticism.

This statement I simply cannot accept. There is an unequivocal
and undeniable distinction between the two.

Textual criticism is one of the few Biblical disciplines based
upon FACTS -- the facts being the readings of the manuscripts.
We may disagree about the significance and interpretation of
these facts, but the facts themselves do not change.

Literary criticism, on the other hand, is purely interpretation.
There is no objective way to tell it from idle speculation.

You may, if you wish, bring textual criticism into literary
criticism. But if you bring literary criticism into textual
criticism, you inevitable move from the realm of the objective
into the realm of the subjective.

Don't do it! The goal should be to make textual criticism more
objective, not less.

[ ... ]

>useful here. There is no original text!

Surely you do not mean this. There was an original text (possibly,
in a few cases, multiple original texts. But always a finite set).
That original text *has not survived* in any known manuscript.
But that doesn't mean it doesn't exist.

>Every text is 

You mean *I'm* allowed to tell you which is the correct version
of your dissertation? Somehow I doubt you'd be happy if I were
to do so....

>New Testament texts are 

Have you considered the implications of this? What you are saying
is that -- any time *anyone* makes a copying error, it is scripture.
If I were to copy a Biblical passage and write into it, "God is
an illusion of inferior minds," would you accept that as scripture?
Surely not!

>about relationships, than about the "original."

I agree, in the sense that we can never be sure of the original
text. I cannot take this view that we therefore *give up.*
Even if we cannot be sure we have the original text, we can
certainly seek for the earliest surviving text.

My apologies to the rest of the list for this rant-and-rave.
The physicist in me strikes again, no doubt. :-)

Bob Waltz
[email-masked]

---

From: ANDREW SMITH <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 1997 10:07:22 -0500 (EST)

> There is no objective way to tell it from idle speculation.

Another way to express the difference between TC and LC is that TC is
ultimately about physical reality - ink on paper, an archeological fact.
LC is about mental realities - ideas and thoughts. This is true even when
TC and LC are being used and applied in non-religous arenas: Shakespearean
and Aristotelian texts, for example.

> But that doesn't mean it doesn't exist.

I have serious reservations about how it would ever be possible to find
Derida, his thoughts, or his works "useful."

---

From: Patrick Durusau <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 21 Jan 1997 09:16:15 -0500

Actually I counted to something higher than 10 before deciding to reply
briefly to Hurtado's comments on deconstructionism.
A sampling of his remarks is enough to reveal the tone of his post:

> "deconstructionist" road.  There lies madness!  

>  Radical

One of the literary critics who I assume Hurtado would include in his
et. al. is Stanley Fish.  Interested text critics might want to read his
_Is There a Text in This Class_ and _Doing What Comes Naturally_ before
accepting these remarks as reasons to dismiss deconstructionism as
unworthy of their attention.  

Hurtado also says: 

> But none of
> realization clearly.  

I have not read any postmodernist critic that denies that books are
indeed written by authors.  It is the leap from this physical "fact" to
a reading of the text that claims to have the same epistemological class
as the fact of writing that causes concern.  The "text" as artifact is
different from the "text" as read.  One is simply a question of the
existence of some type of writing material with certain marks on it, a
determination that can be made without regard to the ability to read the
message.  The other is a question of interpreting the marks that appear
on the writing material and what epistemological claims can be made for
those interpretations. (Yes, I would argue that there are no readings
that are not interpretations within "interpretive communities." See the
works cited above by Stanley Fish. The notion that some readings are
self-evident or resisted simply by those who refuse to see the clear
evidence seeks to avoid an examination of underlying epistemology of the
claimant.)

> deconstructionism represents?

I do not think that textual criticism can claim to be a "historical
question" unless text critics are simply concerned with "texts" as
artifacts. (I am ignoring for this discussion the abandonment of the
"history as given" model by historians.)  Most of the text critics on
this list are concerned with not only the "text" as artifact but also
with its relationship to other texts and ultimately, an interpretation
of the text.  Postmodernist literary criticism does not mean that text
critics must/should abandon their favorite techniques or methods.  It
does mean that textual critics should examine the epistemology that
underlies claims to know the meaning of a text when it was written,
considering that the text was written in a 2nd language of the critic,
some 1900 years more or less ago, in completely different social and
cultural settings and preserved only in incomplete copies.

Patrick

Patrick Durusau
Information Technology
Scholars Press
[email-masked]

---

From: Bart Ehrman <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 21 Jan 1997 14:59:36 -0500 (EST)

Let me just say that I find P. Durusau's comments, personally,
convincing (on literary theory and post-modernist approaches to texts),
and not at *all* off-topic with respect to textual criticism.  As it turns
out, I have found Stanley Fish's work in particular to be completely
germane to the sorts of things we do in the field (which involves, among
other things, determining not only what writers wrote but also what
readers read), and used it explicitly, in fact, as the theoretical
framework within which to situate my study _The Orthodox Corruption of
Scripture_.  The point I tried to make there is that every rereading of a
text is a rewriting of the text, and what the scribes did when they
literally rewrote the text is analogous, in significant ways, with what
each of us does (whether we choose to acknowledge it or not) every time we
read a text.   (To my knowledge, every textual specialist who has reviewed
the book has overlooked this theoretical placement of its analysis.)

    I've been tempted to write a short paper entitled "When Stanley Fish
Met Constantine von Tischendorf" to play this out a bit, but haven't
gotten around to it.  At least I have a title...

-- Bart D. Ehrman, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

---

From: "Professor L.W. Hurtado" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 1997 09:37:34 +000

Bart and I seem to have different appraisals of the value and even 
the import of radical "post-modernist" theory.  Of course, every 
reader has no choice but to decide what a text means, and in that 
sense is terribly important in the reading/interpreting process.  
And, of course, when texts are copied by hand, this "reading" will 
also affect the copying/transmission.
But the point Bart seems to be missing about radical postmodernist 
theory (e.g., Fish, Lyotard, et alia), is that in their view *you 
can't really criticize any reading as to whether it is more or less 
correct, for there is no standard theoretical or otherwise by which 
to talk about "correct"*.  That is, Bart, your term "orthodox 
*corruption*" is out of bounds on postmodernist terms--there can be 
no "corruption" for there is no standard by which to make such 
judgments, or else *all* reading/copying is "corruption" so what's 
the big deal?  Do you really want to embrace this approach to our 
field, Bart?

Larry Hurtado

L. W. Hurtado
University of Edinburgh,
New College
Mound Place

---

From: "Professor L.W. Hurtado" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 1997 09:58:06 +000

Patrick Durusau responds to my post about postmodernist theory & TC 

> unworthy of their attention.  

Yup.  I agree. Fish gave lectures at the U of Manitoba during my 
tenure there, and so I think I have some idea of his views, and I 
stand by my statements.  I have not "dismissed deconstructionism as 
unworthy", but have warned about embracing the approach uncritically. 
 Deconstructionists and other "postmodernists" rightly point to the 
complicated process involved in reading, and rightly emphasize the 
role of readers and reading communities--no problem there.  But the 
more radical theorists celebrate this difficulty and effectively deny 
any relevance or possibility of attempting to gain access to the 
author(s) of a text, thus effectively denying the huuman communiction 
process that lies at the basis of all humane sciences.  If students 
of this strand of theory haven't picked this up, I beg to suggest 
further reading.
D. continues: 
> as the fact of writing that causes concern. 

And I know of no responsible interpreter who would make the same 
epistemological claim for his/her interpretation as he/she would for 
the existence of the text!  Let's not erect straw men.  My point was 
that authors and speakers use language (and written language signs) 
to *communicate meaning*, and any theoretical construct that denies 
or disdains this is both misguided and anti-human.  I am by no means 
the only (or best read) person to make basically the same criticism 
about the solipsistic tendency of radical postmodernist theory. 

> artifacts.
But reconstructing the text-as-artefact is *exactly* a key aim of 
textual criticism:  i.e. the aim of reconstructing the text of the 
4th century (ala Hort) or the 2nd cent, or the "autograph"--these are 
all this kind of text-as-artefact question.

> (I am ignoring for this 
discussion the abandonment of the
> "history as given" model by historians.)  
If D. here alludes to a 19th cent. von Rankian view of history, this 
is another straw man, which I am glad he chooses not to employ.

 >Most 
of the text critics on
> cultural settings and preserved only in incomplete copies.

Yes, of course!  We all need to be continually urged to humility in 
our claims to understand (a good Christian virtue!).  And all the 
specific difficulties D. mentions are evident.  But these in no way 
justify the *theoretical* construct that denies the *validity* of 
the  attempt to wrestle with these difficulties and (with all due 
humility for each attempt) seek to overcome them to some degree in 
the effort to understand something or someone, and not simply offer 
"interpretations" whose only claim to value (a la Fish) can be that 
they are entertaining or innovative.  There is a *serious* leap in 
logic here, if real difficulties involved in reading/understanding an 
ancient text (e.g., cultural and linguistic distance, uncertainty of 
the textual reading, etc.) are taken as a basis for disdain toward 
the approach to texts as vehicles of meanings that can come *to* us 
and not simply *from* us.

Selah,
Larry Hurtado
  
L. W. Hurtado
University of Edinburgh,
New College
Mound Place

---

From: Bart Ehrman <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 1997 07:49:41 -0500 (EST)

It seems to me that what you're giving is a *caricature* of
postmodernist approaches to texts.  Where, Larry, did you get the idea
that postmodernists have no theoretical grounds on which to evaluate
different readings of a text??? (Not from Fish, I can assure you!) (You
should reread him!) (Actually, everyone should reread him, in my opinion)

    One point at issue may simply be rather banal, viz., what you mean by
a "correct" reading.

    I should also say that there are not many folk working in the biblical
field who are intimately familiar with postmodernist discourse from the
*inside* (as opposed to the dilletantes, who will always, I'm afraid to
say, be with us) -- i.e. people who actually read this stuff on its own
terms and for its own merit rather than simply seeing how they can come up
with a different approach to interpreting Mark, or whatever.  The ones in
this small crowd who have talked to me about "Orthodox Corruption" have
actually *liked* its approach to textual criticism (well ... they _said_
they did :-)).  And they seem to be the ones who have appreciated the full
ironies of the title. 

-- Bart

---

From: "Professor L.W. Hurtado" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 1997 14:35:59 +000

> should reread him!) (Actually, everyone should reread him, in my opinion)

I got the idea from Fish and from others.  E.g., when asked why he 
should get a handsome salary for interpreting English Lit., if there 
was no real possibility of talking about validity in interpretation, 
and when someone else might do the job cheaper, he responded by 
saying "Because I can make it entertaining".  "Postmodernist" should 
probably always be put into quote marks because it represents a 
diversity of theoretists, and because all sorts of people claim to 
embrace the term who then use it to represent quite a wide assortment 
of views & approaches.  I've referre here to what I term "radical" 
examples/versions, in which it is simply so that the theoretical aim 
of trying compare interpetations in light of what might be argued to 
be more or less probably a meaning intended by an author--any such 
aim is thrown out of court at the outset.  "Historical" readings of 
texts on this sort of view are thus "useful" readings--i.e., readings 
that accord with a current interest or agenda--and this is asserted 
as the only valid criterion for assessing readings (examples can be 
supplied).

>     One point at issue may simply be rather banal, viz., what you mean by

Bart--My point was that it is legitimate to try to determine what may 
be more or less "correct" readings, as distinguished from the view 
that there is no theoretical basis for even entertaining the 
question. I wish to assert that it is not a waste of time for us to 
argue over readings as to whether they are more or less "correct" and 
to argue over what "correct" means.

> with a different approach to interpreting Mark, or whatever.  

Well, I for one freely admit to not being a specialist and expert in 
the burgeoning "postmodernist" literature.  I do, however, base my 
statements and attempted characterizations on real statements from 
advocates of "postmodernist" approaches, and from expositions of such 
theorists by colleagues in various places who *do* make it part of 
their professional expertise to master this material.  But then, on 
what basis would anyone say that my interpretation of postmodernist 
theories is a "caricature", unless it is theoretically possible 
to argue about such things as the relation of texts to the 
intended meanings/ideas/theories of the authors of these texts 
(e.g., Fish's writings!), and about something being "correct" or 
not?
>The ones in

Bart, Count me among those who appreciate the book (though not an 
uncritical appreciation, as I know you would appreciate), and among 
those who detect the irony (and slight mischief?) *intended* (!) in 
the title.  I was being ironic myself!  
Cheers,
Larry Hurtado
 
L. W. Hurtado
University of Edinburgh,
New College
Mound Place

---

From: Bart Ehrman <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 1997 10:19:58 -0500 (EST)

> to argue over what "correct" means.
   Of course we can argue over readings.  What else do you imagine
postmodernist interpreters *do*?  Fish, after all, is a *Milton* scholar,
and his readings of Milton might strike you as remarkably traditional. But
you still haven't answered my question concerning what you think a
"correct" reading is.  (I should point out, by the way, that a more or
less correct reading, to use your phrase, is also more or less incorrect; 
and if all we can do is give readings that are more or less correct, then
our readings always, inevitably, more or less incorrect.  I.e., we
inevitably corrupt the text.  This is quite apart from the question of
what you imagine this "correct" reading to be, which we appear to be able
only more or less to approximate.)

-- Bart Ehrman, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

---

From: "Robert B. Waltz" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 1997 09:44:54 -0700

>only more or less to approximate.)

OK, I'll play the straight man (booby, whatever). Is not the "correct"
reading "the original reading of whatever document you are trying to
reconstruct"?

This might not be the autograph, and it may be that we cannot find
that reading. But surely that is what we are looking for! If not,
what is the point of the exercise?

If I've missed something here (I've never been too interested in
modern forms of destructive literary criticism; indeed, I almost
never read post-18th century literature, other than -- I will
admit -- science fiction), I hope someone will explain.

-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-

                            Robert B. Waltz
                         [email-masked]

Want more loudmouthed opinions about textual criticism?
Try my web page: http://www.skypoint.com/~waltzmn
(A very rough draft of part of the Encyclopedia of NT Textual Criticism)

---

From: Kenneth Litwak <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 1997 08:18:08 -0800

I'm afraid that I'd have to disagree with Bart on his appraisal of 
what *some* writers are saying (if that's not an oxymoron from a 
post-modcernist, especially deconstructinist perspective  -- by 
Derrida's own assertions, he can't say what he means and we can't 
understand it anyway).  I've read Fish and company, along with Barthes, 
Kristeva and others.  I wouldn't claim to be an expert (again, can a 
post-modernist persepctive allow for such a notion as being anexpert at 
what a post-modenist is saying??) but it's fairly clear to me that 
Derrida, Kristeva, and others (no claim that all say this) explicitly 
dismiss the author and have no interest in an author.  All that is left 
is everyone reading what is right in their own eyes, with NO reading 
being privileged.

    Under those terms, textual criticism seems impossible to me.  If we 
have no author, indeed, not even a subject-text (though Kristeva at 
least says there is a subject), how can it be asked "what would Paul 
likely have written here?"  There's no longer an author.  The text has 
been liberated from any such constraining notion as an author or an 
intent.  So we can never do anything but count MSS.  As Larry pointd out 
quite adeqautely, there are no more copyist errors.  When one scribe (I 
forget which MS) in Luke 3 apparently went across the columns instead of 
down, making for a very interestng geneaology, that's not an error.  
It's another, equally valid reading.  I see no way under this construct 
to even defend the idea of doing textual criticism.  How can you 
possibly attempt to get to an autograph, if you can not ask about intent 
or context to help determine what is or is not a "good" reading?  Just 
so you don't wonder, I just spent the last semester working through some 
of these authors and have spent the January break reading Thiselton's 
New Horizons in Hermeneutics.  He seems to show, at a much more erudite 
level than I can, that my appraisals are not far from the mark.

Ken Litwak

---

From: "Professor L.W. Hurtado" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 1997 16:53:53 +000

Bart Ehrman writes to me:

> postmodernist interpreters *do*?  
Yes, postmodernists argue over readings, but not at all necessarily 
about whether any reading approximates anything like a first meaning 
such as might have been intended by the author or understood by first 
readers.  For the postmodernists I dissent from reject any such 
interest, and indeed regard any such thing as chimerical.  I though I 
had made this point fairly clearly.  The issue is not whether 
postmodernist argue (they're human aren't they?), but whether they 
grant any basis for an argument such as historians normally carry on 
(Stanley Fish quote during his Manitoba visit:  "All historians are 
brain-dead".)

> But

Oh indeed so!  My careful way of stating the issue ("more or less 
'correct'") was intended precisely to indicate the provisional and 
thus corrigible nature of any particular interpretative claim.  We 
surely don't have to choose between saying that a reading is either 
*nothing but* the whims of the interpreter (with no possibility of 
seeking the meaning of another such as the author) or must claim to 
be perfectly that author or past event "wie es eigentlich gewesen 
ist".  
In some cases we may be able to say with very high assurance that 
this or that interpretation of data is so very improbable as to be 
almost certainly "incorrect".  In other cases, we may only be able to 
say that this or that interpretation seems to be highly probable as 
to being "correct", or may be judged at least partially "correct".  
By "correct", I mean the attempt achieve some accuracy, completeness 
and faithfulness in understanding something (*under*-standing, with 
the interpreter *seving* the thing to be interpreted, not lording it 
over the thing, as in the will-to-power approach advocated in at 
least some postmodernist theory).
But perhaps this thread of discussion is now too extended and too 
restricted to Bart and me for this particular list.  I do not cherish 
the hope of securing Bart's assent to anything on the basis of these 
brief interchanges.  I seek only to make somewhat clear (!; i.e., as 
clear as this medium and format, and my limited powers of expression 
enable) reasons to distinguish between copyists and authors for 
historical purposes--i.e., copyists copy and/or amend texts which 
have previously been composed.

Cheers.  Larry H. 
L. W. Hurtado
University of Edinburgh,
New College
Mound Place

---

From: ANDREW SMITH <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 1997 13:36:07 -0500 (EST)

On Wed, 22 Jan 1997, Bart Ehrman wrote:

> postmodernist approaches to texts.

*********************

Isn't postmodernism the most cruel "caricature" of itself?

---

From: Nichael Cramer <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 1997 14:18:49 -0500 (EST)

> > postmodernist approaches to texts.

;-)

While I have a lot of sympathy with the sentiment, a more generous (and 
perhaps more accurate) phrasing might be: "Isn't what is called
postmodernism by some of its wielder the most crual "caricature" of itself?"

N

---

From: Bart Ehrman <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 1997 14:39:53 -0500 (EST)

Larry,  I *think* I know what you *mean*.

:-) Bart

P.S. (But I stand by my claim that you're still caricaturing the people
you're taking on!  Fish and co. have a *lot* to teach us unreconstructed
modernists)

---

From: "Professor L.W. Hurtado" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 1997 09:40:52 +000

> you're taking on!  Fish and co. have a *lot* to teach us unreconstructed

Bart,
I certainly *intend* no caricature, but state what I have formed as 
understandings of what thorough-going postmodernist theorists say, 
and have been assured in my understandings by specialists, such as my 
colleague Kevin VanHoozer, et alia.  But it's still possible that my 
understanding is *incorrect*, or only partially (i.e., "more or 
less") correct.
And, for what it's worth, pa-leese don't number me among 
"unreconsructed modernists"--never have been one, couldn't be one.  
Actually, both the latter and radical "postmodernists" seem to me to 
share a common anthropo-centric hubris, though manifesting itself in 
varying ways.  I have deeply held epistemological and theological 
bases for rejecting both positions as untenable--though, to be sure, 
learning much from both (and other) positions.  As is so often the 
case, in my view, rejecting a position doesn't mean it's worthless, 
just inadequate as a resting place or premise.  Many of the positions 
I'd reject (in TC work, for example, radical eclecticism such as 
advocated by Kilpatrick & my friend Keith Elliott) I deem very 
instructive in their respective subject matters--I just find reasons 
to go on to some other position.
As we seem to be winding down this set-to, my thanks for the patience 
of the TC list in this by-path into epistemology, etc.
Larry Hurtado
 
L. W. Hurtado
University of Edinburgh,
New College
Mound Place

---

From: Bart Ehrman <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 1997 07:03:09 -0500 (EST)

Well, maybe "unreconstructed modernist" sounds like a dirty epithet
that you simply don't want to embrace.  Because based on what does seem to
be your assumptions about the hegemony of "correct" understandings of the
"original" meanings of "texts," that somehow we can have access to (if we
just work hard enough at it and apply the right methods), I'd judge that
postmodernist discourse has created only a negative and reactive response,
rather than a rethinking and reformulation of any of your basic
epistemological positions.  I.e., your approach to texts is clearly
modernist, and it doesn't appear to be a modernism affected by anything
resembling poststructuralist theory.  If that's not an unreconstructed
modernism, then I'll eat my Fish. 

:-) Bart

---

From: "Professor L.W. Hurtado" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 1997 13:23:34 +000

> modernism, then I'll eat my Fish. 

Well, I must grant that I didn't have to wait for Fish etc. to 
criticize enlightenment/"modernist" approaches to knowledge to see 
the problems involved--so in that sense at least I guess I haven't 
been all that re-shaped as to problematics of "modernism" by this 
particular theoretical wave.  But I do sincerely grant that 
"poststructuralist/postmodernist" theoreticians have pointed to real 
difficulties in interpretation, real logical issues invovled for all 
of us, and that we can thus learn--even if we do not become 
disciples.
I utterly reject the term "hegemony" to describe my approach.  I 
do not advocate any group controlling anything; I do not advocate 
some particular view being considered binding by any force other than 
its power to gain assent through powers of reasoning-persuasion.  
This term "hegemony" has become an epithet of no meaning any more, 
rather like "fascist" was in my grad student days--meaning merely 
anyone I want to label as not falling into line with me & my drinking 
buddies.  Can we lay off such useless kidney punches, Bart?
I do advocate the reasonableness of the idea that scholars in a 
particular body of inquiry *can* attempt to evaluate the comparitive 
validity and adequacy of theories, interpretations etc., and 
can/should attempt to do so by attempting to develop and use bases 
other than mere social coercion.  I do think that in TC and other 
subjects these bases include legitimately the idea of an author or 
artist or copyist or group (as the case may be) and that it is these 
others whom we can attempt to engage via what they say/have said, 
written, constructed, etc.  And I hold that we can try to develop 
means of assessing interpretations as to how well they help us engage 
these others via the texts or other relevant items being interpreted. 
How can I help but react with some considerable negativity to some 
forms of postmodernist theory if I find the positions illogical in 
some vital ways, and the aims anti-human and inimical to the 
nourishment of humane learning?  But not all aspects or examples of 
"postmodernist" advocacy seem to me so, and even misguided ideas can 
clarify our own thinking.
I do not hold, and have not stated here, that we can gain access to 
some single "correct" and hegemonically-enforced interpretation "if 
we just work hard and apply the right methods".  I have advocated the 
view that it is not unreasonable to use the notions of "correct" and 
"incorrect" as theoretical concepts, and that we should/can try to 
develop appropriate means of seeking to do *justice* to the subject 
matters we study (and those who produced the subject matter we 
study), while granting freely that any attempt must also be 
critically examined on the assumption that it is corrigible and, 
the effort difficult, the more where there is distance twixt us and 
the item being studied (such as linguistic, cultural, social, gender 
etc. distances).  Indeed, I do *not* harbor the notion that by trying 
very hard we can arrive at a final statement of things "wie es 
eigentlich gewesen ist":  When have I said otherwise?
SO, Bart.  If we are to continue this discussion, here or (lest we 
tax overmuch the patience of others) elsewhere, let us attempt to 
understand each other carefully, and resist distorting what each 
other is saying.  You don't like my reaction to some forms of modern 
theory--fair enough.  But try to understand what I'm saying, and 
listen when I tell you that your characterizations seem to me 
distorting rhetoric rather than accurate reflections. (And I hope we 
know each other well enough for you to know, Bart, that my direct 
manner of expression here in *no* way indicates any personal 
hostility.  I say this here for the benefit of other readers on whom 
this missive is inflicted.)
 Larry Hurtado

L. W. Hurtado
University of Edinburgh,
New College
Mound Place

---

From: Bart Ehrman <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 1997 10:49:51 -0500 (EST)

Larry,

   I suppose we're getting to the point where everyone else can start
ignoring us, what with our kidneys getting punched and our knees getting
jerked (and our noses getting tweaked).  I want only to say that what I
*meant* (! even a close reading evidently didn't reveal it, cause there it
was in black and white!) (well, the text actually *does* come in different
colors these days...) (my view, of course, is that it always has) is that
the *readings* you posit (which are, I would maintain, "constructed" 
rather than "discovered" in the text; this I think we would agree, is at
the heart of our disagreement) are hegemonic, not that you are.  Once you
introduce "correctness"  into the equation, there's no backing out. Of
course, given your complaint that I'm not listening to you -- which I
heard, by the way -- this misconstrual strikes me as a shade ironic.  But
if you want to raise the point, I'm happy to pursue it:  weren't *you* the
one who started this strand by urging us to avoid deconstruction because
that leads us down a deadly path?  (Wish I had save the original message
to quote the words, but it's off in the ionosphere).  That strikes *me* as
an attempt at control. 

   Quite apart from all that, given your postings, I think there's no
point at all in denying that you believe there are such things as "texts"
that have "meanings" that are there to be discovered, that the ways to
discover these "correct" readings involve applying proper methods of
interpretation, intelligence, and effort, and that those who apply
"improper" methods, or who are wanting in intelligence or effort, are not
likely to discover the correct meanings.  If that isn't modernism in its
most naked form, then I'd like you to tell me what is.  And if you didn't
have to wait for Fish to learn about the problems of this modernist view,
then I'd like you to tell me in clear terms what you think these problems
*are*.

    Let me end for anyone else who hasn't had the good sense simply to
delete these little tirades back and forth by saying that Larry and I are
indeed friends and are probably having a good time (though it is starting
to heat up in here). Moreover, this conversation is not at *ALL* unrelated
to textual criticism.  If this discipline is involved in reconstructing
*texts* then it makes some sense to figure out what it is that we think
we're *doing*.  For example, the question of what a text *is* is not
unproblematic.  And the questino of whether scribes who reconstructed the
text were doing something different from what we all do every time we read
a text strikes me as particularly germane.

---

From: "Professor L.W. Hurtado" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 1997 16:17:17 +000

As the change in subject heading indicates, I seek (with Bart, I 
think) to turn back to textual criticism (yup, there I am being 
directive ["control" freak that I allegedly am] again).
If Bart wants to label as "modernist" anyone who thinks there are 
such things as texts with relations to authors as well as readers, 
and that not all readings are equally valid, then we can't stop him, 
can we (nor should we, except by force of reason).  But I would have 
thought these sorts of ideas, for holding which I must plead guilty, 
were much too old to be thought "modernist".  But I digress.

The actions of scribes do seem to have overlapped those of readers, 
though not always and not one-to-one.  When a scribe mis-spells a 
word but it's clear enough what the word is, and that the word is 
what likely lay in the exemplar, this is a bit different from a 
scribe making a deliberate alteration in the interests of 
"clarifying" a passage or removing embarrassing statements or such.  
In such cases, in fact, we may have a scribe quite clearly reading 
the meaning of his exemplar and not liking what he reads, and/or 
worrying what others might make of the reading.
This is different still from a reader understanding a text so poorly 
that he/she seriously misconstrues it (e.g., as in allegations of 
"caricature" which we've all had experience of on this list in recent 
exchanges).  Unless, I suppose, one were able to establish that a 
reader has *deliberately* mis-represented the meaning of a text, in 
which case we are able to (1) establish a "ocrrect" meaning, and (2) 
establish the intention of a reader.
So, I'm not entirely convinced that literary-critical theories of 
reading/interpretation (even if accepted as valid and accurate for 
that activity) are fully adequate for the text-critical questions of 
how texts have been copied.
Larry Hurtado
 
L. W. Hurtado
University of Edinburgh,
New College
Mound Place

---

From: Kenneth Litwak <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 1997 08:38:49 -0800

When I was first introduced to TC in the OT, I was told about the 
relative value of various versions, e.g., latin, Syriac, Armenian, etc. 
Now that I've read more widely, like Tov, McCarter and Klein, it seems 
to me that one's assessment of the value of an early version for 
determining the reading which is most likely "original", depends in 
large part upon how closely said version adheres to either the MT or the 
 OG,and one's judgment about which of those two traditions is closer to 
the original. What I'd like to know is this:  are there any features of 
the ancient versions, independent of their proximity in readings to the 
MT or OG, which indicate they are more or less reliable witnesses to the 
"original" text?

Ken Litwak

---

From: [email-masked] (Ulrich Schmid)
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 97 19:07:09 +0100

On Thu, 23 Jan 1997, Bart Ehrman wrote:

[snip]
>Yindeed friends and are probably having a good time (though it is starting
>unproblematic.  

Give it a try, Bart. What *is* a text? Suggestions without * * are particularly 
welcome.

>And the questino of whether scribes who reconstructed the

There is at least one difference at first sight. Reading a text includes some 
interest in the interplay of signs, while copying can be done by mechanically 
drawing horizontal and vertical lines in exactly the same way as they were found 
in a source copy.

Ulrich Schmid, Muenster

---

From: Bart Ehrman <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 1997 12:28:31 -0500 (EST)

> Give it a try, Bart. What *is* a text? Suggestions without * * are
> particularly welcome. 

   OK, I'll give it a try, but you're really tying my hands by ruling my
asterisks out of court; and I want to have the rights to provisional
claims, since I'm extremely rushed right now, don't have time for this,
and should instead be trying to find my desk, which, by all reports, is
somewhere in my office.  

   But off the top of my head, I guess I think a "written" text (is this
what you wanted?) is a concatenation of symbols on a page that is socially
constructed to convey meaning.  How am I doing?  (I think, by the way,
that any conceivable concatenation of symbols is in fact able to be
construed as meaningful)

   (I'd love to hear alternative constructions, by the way)

> There is at least one difference at first sight. Reading a text includes
> some interest in the interplay of signs, while copying can be done by
> mechanically drawing horizontal and vertical lines in exactly the same
> way as they were found in a source copy. 
> 
   Now see, by forsaking asterisks you've limited yourself.  I'd say that
"copying *can* be done" this way.  And it probably *is* (sorry) done that
way by scribes who can't read the language they are transcribing (I
suppose Codex Theta could be an example?), and possibly by scribes who
"space out" in the course of their labors.  But then again, a lot of us
space out when we read, with the letters making some kind of presentation
to our eyes but not to our heads, so I'm not sure the processes are all
that different.  

   I guess maybe one difference could be that scribes _are_ (how's that?)
able to reproduce exactly what they inherit in their exemplars, whereas
readers, I would maintain, can never reproduce exactly the meanings either
of the author or of any other readers.

---

From: ANDREW SMITH <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 1997 13:04:04 -0500 (EST)

On Thu, 23 Jan 1997, Kenneth Litwak wrote:

> are there any features of 

*********************

One feature worth considering is whether an ancient version gives evidence
of a "slavish" translation, e.g., retaining a Hebrew word-order which is
not native to the target language, or literal renderings of idioms which
don't make sense in the target language. A version with these features is
likely to be more "faithful" to the "original" text (whatever "original
text" might be!).

---

From: "James R. Adair" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 1997 14:30:18 -0500 (EST)

> > MT or OG, which indicate they are more or less reliable witnesses to the 

James Barr, in _The Typology of Literalism in Ancient Biblical Translations_,
identifies the following criteria for determining whether or not a given 
translation unit is literal (20): (1)Êdivision of the text into elements or 
segments, and the sequence in which they are represented; 
(2)Êquantitative addition or omission of elements; (3)Êconsistency in 
rendering lexical data; (4)Êaccuracy and level of semantic information, 
especially when dealing with figurative language; (5)Êetymological 
renderings; and (6)Êlevel of text and level of analysis.

The last three items are unquantifiable and so of less value in any kind 
of concrete analysis of translations.  The first category can be split 
into two: segmentation (the rendering of one item in the source language 
with one item in the target language) and word order.

Tov, in his _The Text-Critical Use of the Septuagint in Biblical 
Research_ (54-60), offers a similar list: lexical consistency, segmentation, 
word order, quantitative representation, and linguistic adequacy of the 
renderings.  He notes, however, that the last is subjective and difficult to 
quantify.

Building on these ideas (and some of my own), I would suggest the 
following quantifiable criteria for measuring the relative literalness of 
certain aspects of a translation: (1) lexical consistency, (2) 
consistency in the use of word classes (e.g., participles rendered by 
participles), (3) grammatical consistency, (4) segmentation, (5) word 
order, and (6) quantitative representation (i.e., additions and 
omissions).  Finally, I would also note that a translation can be quite 
literal in certain aspects of its rendering (and thus more useful for 
reconstructing the apparent Vorlage) and freer in other aspects.  For 
example, in Samuel (and I suspect elsewhere) Jerome is quite literal in 
rendering the Hebrew word order but extremely free in his choice of 
conjunctions with which to render Hebrew conjunctions.  Rather than 
saying that a particular version is useful for text-critical purposes 
(i.e., it is a literal version), we should instead say that the 
translation is literal with respect to word order and lexical 
consistency, fairly literal with respect to segmentation and grammatical 
consistency, and free with respect to quantitative representation.  Of 
course, it must also be remembered that a translation might not be 
consistent throughout, so each book, for example, might need to be 
checked individually.

Jimmy Adair
Manager of Information Technology Services, Scholars Press
    and
Managing Editor of TELA, the Scholars Press World Wide Web Site
---------------> http://scholar.cc.emory.edu <-----------------

---

From: [email-masked] (Ulrich Schmid)
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 97 22:17:53 +0100

On Thu, 23 Jan 1997, Bart Ehrman wrote:

>constructed to convey meaning.  How am I doing?  

Oh, you are doing fine. If I understand you correctly, (a) meaning is socially 
constructed, too; (b) "to convey" does not rule out the fact that an individual 
creating a written text may have his/her own intended meaning he/she likes to 
communicate.
No problems with that.

>(I think, by the way,

Now, what does this passive voice construction imply when compared to your 
definition? Any restrictions with respect to either (a) or (b)?

[Schmid]
>to our eyes but not to our heads, so I'm not sure the processes are all

Now, that's fine. You conceded my example to be theoretically possible, in fact, 
you even added some evidence (Codex Theta) that it may have happened 
practically.

>of the author or of any other readers.

I wish I could do the same with respect to your example. I have no problems 
conceding theoretically that "scribes _are_ able to reproduce exactly what they 
inherit in their exemplars". However, I fail to add any evidence that this has 
happened practically. Now, if something seems theoretically plausible (exact 
copy) that has, as far as I know, not been practically achieved until the 
invention of printing, why should it be theoretically implausible to assume 
exact reproduction of meaning? To my mind, the crucial term in your example is 
"exactly". 

Ulrich Schmid, Muenster

---

From: "Professor L.W. Hurtado" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 1997 09:43:03 +000

> of the author or of any other readers.

One tiny quibble (which I probably shouldn't allow myself in view of 
the cyber-space I've already taken up here, but, hey, it's Friday):  
Although I think it's an extremely rare happening, if at all, I'd 
want to leave open the theoretical possibility of a person 
understanding another rather well, perhaps even "exactly".  Indeed, 
one sometimes here's excited cries from a speaker or writer to a 
hearer or conversation partner or even a reader such as "*Exactly*!  
You've caught my point clearly! Wonderful!".  Whether, of course, 
this sort of cry actually reflects some truth depends upon the 
speaker or writer accurately enough understanding the hearer or 
reader!
Larry Hurtado
 
L. W. Hurtado
University of Edinburgh,
New College
Mound Place

---

From: Bart Ehrman <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 1997 09:01:25 -0500 (EST)

> 
> I wish I could do the same with respect to your example. I have no
> problems conceding theoretically that "scribes _are_ able to reproduce
> exactly what they inherit in their exemplars". However, I fail to add
> any evidence that this has happened practically. Now, if something seems
> theoretically plausible (exact copy) that has, as far as I know, not
> been practically achieved until the invention of printing, why should it
> be theoretically implausible to assume exact reproduction of meaning? To
> my mind, the crucial term in your example is "exactly".

   I'd say that your statement about scribes is categorically false.
There were hundreds and hundreds of scribes who copied John 1:1, to pick
an example, *exactly* as they found it in their exemplar.  They may have
messed up later on (and some other scribes messed up at 1:1), but they
reproduced precisely the words of this verse.  I would maintain, however,
that none of them did, or could, exactly reproduce the meaning of the
verse as it was "intended" by its author.  We don't _have_ the author, we
just have his text.  Frankly, I can conceive of no way to reach an
author's intentions except by guesswork (only a couple of my students have
guessed my intentions for starting this strand; and even they were only
approximately right.  And they know me and how I think.  Which of us is a
personal friend of any of the authors of the New Testament?)

   EVen if we did know the author, I would maintain that we couldn't know
exactly what he meant, down to the slightest nuances.  The reason I think
this has to do with the way language seems to work. On the simple level,
we learn the meanings of words through usage -- i.e., through our
experience of words, spoken and written.  Every time we hear or read a
word, it registers with us as appropriate (or not, sometimes) in the
particular context in which it has been expereinced, and these contexts in
which we hear words used (starting with when we are babies)  then
influence the way we use the words ourselves, as we imitate their use by
others.  Words mean what they do, of course, only within a context;  when
you change the context of a word, it can come to mean something completely
different, sometimes opposite.  All of these contextually based linguistic
experiences provide us with a comfortable range of meaning for a word. 
Now the problem is that none of us has experienced the words we've heard
in different contexts; necessarily, since meaning is context-generated (or
at least, I should think everyone would agree, context-related), words
sometimes mean radically different meanings to different people; but even
common words mean *slightly* different things (extremely finely shaded
nuances) to everyone, because everyone has had different experiences of
them.

    When it comes to John 1:1, it can be shown with absolutely no
difficulty that intelligent well-meaning readers, even with similar
cultural, historical, and religious backgrounds, interpret the words
differently.  They hear the words differently, even though they are the
same words.  And even those who hear the words pretty similarly, can't
possibly hear them identically.  And frankly, without the author around to
query for a few years about what he "meant" I should think we could all
agree that we are probably never really going to agree.  (I would argue
that even if he *were* around to query, we still wouldn't agree; even
more, that even then we couldn't really *know*, since the words he *spoke*
to us would have, necessarily, the same problems as the words he *wrote*.
THey would have to be construed, and each of us would understand them in
slightly -- sometimes very slightly -- different ways.)

---

From: "Robert B. Waltz" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 1997 08:24:17 -0700

On Fri, 24 Jan 1997, Bart Ehrman <[email-masked]> wrote:

[ ... ]

>this has to do with the way language seems to work.

I think that this proves Bart Ehrman's point: None of us can figure out
what he's saying, or why. Therefore language has no meaning. :-)

Q.E.D.

Seriously, folks, while it's true that people interpret words
differently, there is at least enough common ground that we
generally manage to communicate.

Is there *really* anyone out there who doesn't know what "Jesus
wept" means? We may disagree about why, but surely we all agree
that tears were coming out of his eyes.

Or maybe not. I'm trained in math; maybe I have this strange
tendency to believe that the world makes sense. It's not
always good sense, but it's sense. :-)

                            Robert B. Waltz
                         [email-masked]

---

From: [email-masked] (Ulrich Schmid)
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 97 17:54:32 +0100

On Fri, 24 Jan 1997, Bart Ehrman wrote:

[Ehrmann]

>> my mind, the crucial term in your example is "exactly".

[Ehrman]
>an example, *exactly* as they found it in their exemplar.

If someone can give evidence that there once existed an "exemplar" that solely 
"inherited" John 1:1, I would agree. The point is that when talking about 
"scribes" and "what they inherit in their exemplars" we are dealing with 
physical evidence. As long as we focus on physical evidence, we have to say that 
there is no indisputable evidence that GJohn ever was "reconstructed" in bits 
and pieces by scribes. Or to put it the other way, scribes who had to copy John 
1:1 usually copied John 1:2ff too. And, if they did, they for sure would have 
altered the text they had to copy sooner or later. This is due to human nature 
and, as far as I can see, the main reason for the existence of TC, and it does 
not affect the theoretical assumption of the one perfect scribe, who not only 
resisted to add further errors to the text, but also refused to correct the 
errors of his forerunner(s) ending up with "reproducing exactly what he/she 
inherited in his/her exemplar". 

	Now, everyone, of course, is free to isolate any concatenation of 
symbols (e.g., John 1:1) out of a much larger concatenation of symbols (John 
1:1-21:25) claiming both to be "texts" (plural). But this enterprise can not be 
paralleled with what real scribes did when they copied real texts. Therefore, I 
find John 1:1 as counter-example to real scibal activities not very compelling. 
Quite to the contrary, I suspect therein some categorical confusion.

Ulrich Schmid, Muenster

---

From: Bart Ehrman <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 1997 11:55:58 -0500 (EST)

Well, of course it's simply not true that there were never "real"
scribes who simply copied one verse here or there rather than an entire
manuscript.  Any church father quoting a solitary verse or two did
precisely this -- and sometimes, as we have reason to believe, they
actually consulted an exemplar before doing so; moreover, there were
amulets, etc. with very small portions of scripture on them, copied just
for the purpose.  So I'm not sure that I see your point.  Of course it's
not absolutely impossible for a scribe to reproduce a text accurately;
it's just extremely difficult for long texts. 

   BTW, are you saying that John 1:1 by itself is not a "real" text?  If
so, then I'd like to know what you yourself understand a text to be. 

> 
> 	Now, everyone, of course, is free to isolate any concatenation
> of symbols (e.g., John 1:1) out of a much larger concatenation of
> symbols (John 1:1-21:25) claiming both to be "texts" (plural). But this
> enterprise can not be paralleled with what real scribes did when they
> copied real texts. Therefore, I find John 1:1 as counter-example to real
> scibal activities not very compelling. Quite to the contrary, I suspect
> therein some categorical confusion. 
> 
> Ulrich Schmid, Muenster
>