Subject: Methods: <arguing logic and ... arguing faith>

From: "Peter R. Burton" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 14 Sep 97 23:27:46 -0500

(This long note does not have conclusions about the comparative significance of 
extant NT texts.)

Concerning methods:

In the course of quite another discussion Robert B. Waltz has written:

<<Thus, I would note to the readers that I am arguing logic and
Evensen is arguing faith. I can only hope you'll make the right
choice between the two. To me, it's obvious -- but then, I am
trained as a physicist and mathematician. No doubt I'm biased. :-) >>

Whatever Robert Waltz and others are arguing about, this is indeed a curious 
choice of words.

Does this mean that both logic and faith are different fields in which logical 
argument occurs?  Or does it imply that logic and faith are categorically 
distinct fields, where reason is logically applied to what are often called 
facts and where non-logical operations are applied to details of belief?  Or 
something else?

On a quick reading the appeal to training in physics and mathematics might seem 
to help us know what <the choice between the two> is.  One normally thinks of 
mathematics as the height of logical rigour applied to numbers: no needed 
beliefs here, just facts about numbers and their manipulation according to 
strict, valid operations.

The trouble is this is not what mathematics is.  Nor more basically is it what 
formal logic is either.  We have to take it for granted that there is such a 
thing as a number and that we understand what that means before we can have even
the most simple meaningful mathematical statement.  This unprovable 
understanding we have of a number is something we have to put our trust in to 
engage in mathematical reasoning.  (Although it might not seem obvious this type
of assumption is required for our accurate use of ordinary human language as 
well.)

Another common feature of mathematics is the appeal to intuition in the course 
of proofs.  Accepted statements similar to <it is intuitively obvious that ...> 
and <by intuition we can see that ...> riddle the pages of great mathematicians'
works and today's textbooks alike.  Mathematicians are thus stating of the 
transition from one statement to the next, <It's obvious> - just as Robert Waltz
has written above.  From time to time, some mathematical genius comes up with 
statements that replace the appeal to intuition at some stage of a famous proof.
In the meantime mathematicians live confident that their established proofs, 
intuition and all, are correct and so reliable.  The faith required of 
mathematicians in mathematical procedures to do mathematics is of course even 
more extensive than this.

As the logical aspects of physics may be deemed to be mathematics applied to the
physical world that we see, so may physicists be obliged to note that they must 
also have significant faith in their work to be able to do their work.

An absolutely categorical distinction between reason (including logic) and faith
(including how we do things and ought to do them) has been explored now for 
centuries, but in every discipline it has failed.

As a result the choice offered by Robert Waltz in his statements above is not at
all clear to me.

Similarly, easily stated claims by some about suspending one's beliefs to engage
in text criticism should be refined.  We all depend upon our beliefs to engage 
in whatever we engage in.  Clearly also an atheist might argue for theism for 
some purpose (e.g. participate in a formal debate) without being committed to 
theism and vice versa.  The claims need to be refined.

I have engaged here in meta-physics, drawing on ordinary conclusions of 
philosophy of mathematics and epistemology - not physics, not mathematics, not 
text criticism, not religious doctrine.  Perhaps discussions in every field, 
including text criticism, would be more helpful if we were to be clearer about 
the extents of our own commitments while presenting our observations and 
arguments and avoided indefensible distinctions.

Much easier said (as it is so often now) than done. Actively trying to examine 
one's activity is one of the most difficult activities one knows.  To be well 
aware of the actual extent of one's commitments while engaged in an academic 
field like text criticism is even more difficult, possibly impossible.

I am not, by the way, pessimistic about our knowing things, just dissatisfied 
with some long held analyses and the ways in which they are used in discussions.
Another has said, <There is more to knowing than knowing will ever know.>

Peter Burton
[email-masked]

---

From: "Robert B. Waltz" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 15 Sep 1997 09:02:37 -0500 (CDT)

>(This long note does not have conclusions about the comparative significance of 

But it *does* have significance for how we conduct textual criticism.

>facts and where non-logical operations are applied to details of belief?  Or 

I am willing to accept that my statements could have been clearer. I
think my point is valid anyway.

But let me state my position on this as clearly as I can.

Hebrews says "Faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction
of things not seen." In other words, faith operates where evidence is
lacking. To someone of my background, that means *only* where evidence
is lacking.

A simple example: The Old Testament lists bats among the birds,
and porpoises among the fish. Both, according to the biologist,
wrong. And we have evidence. Therefore no amount of faith will
make me believe a bat is a bird!

There are many matters about which we have no verifiable evidence --
e.g. the existence of God, the resurrection of Jesus, the existence
of an afterlife. Faith may legitimately operate in these areas.

But where external evidence exists -- as, say, in the matter of the
existence of New Testament manuscripts -- I cannot admit faith. My
only recourse is to examine the evidence with all the physical,
mathematical, and logical resources at my disposal.

Being human, of course, I may fall into the trap of listening to
faith. But it is not my objective.

>engage in mathematical reasoning.

I most strenuously disagree. This may seem heresy, but I would argue that
mathematics is more fundamental than God. That is, I can conceive of a
universe without God. I can conceive of a system which contains no
universe. (It's not even *nothing*; it's just *not*.) But mathematics
exists whether God, or the universe, exist at all. Since mathematics has
*no objective reality*, it does not need *any* objective universe or
supposition to exist. It exists, uncreated -- though most of it remains
undiscovered.

[ ... ]

>statements that replace the appeal to intuition at some stage of a famous proof.

I must dispute *this*, too. Yes, a mathematician will often state that
"it is obvious that," etc. But that just means that the proof of the steps
taken is (in the eyes of the lecturer, of course) so obvious that it need
not be stated. The lecturer could spell out the proof -- but it's a waste
of time.

[ ... ]

>also have significant faith in their work to be able to do their work.

With this I agree. Once we apply mathematics to the "real world" we have to
start making assumptions about its validity. 

>centuries, but in every discipline it has failed.

I do not consider the quest to have failed. I think the failure lies in
human beings who are incapable of operating without faith.

Yet another reason, IMHO, for trying for objective methods of criticism:
If the computer does it, it will be victim to the peculiarities of its
programmers, but at least it will obey those peculiarities rigorously. :-)

>As a result the choice offered by Robert Waltz in his statements above is not at

I hope this makes things clearer. (Clear enough, at least, that I've
snipped the rest of this letter.)

-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-

                        Robert B. Waltz
                     [email-masked]

Want more loudmouthed opinions about textual criticism?
Try my web page: http://www.skypoint.com/~waltzmn
(A site inspired by the Encyclopedia of NT Textual Criticism)