Subject: Re: tc-list new book review on TC

From: STORYBROWN <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 21 Dec 1997 13:22:45 EST

In a message dated 97-12-18 12:37:08 EST, [email-masked] writes:

<< *All* sciences make assumptions. The goal is simply to reduce the
assumptions, and test all things possible. >>

       I would just step out of lurkerdom to note in passing that this view is
fairly garden variety Kantianism and subject to all the objections to which
Kantianism is open.  The doctrine that knowledge begins with its own
criticism, or that nothing can be known unless first critically proven, in
fact presumes this proven knowledge without first critically proving it.
There is no algorithmical formula or demonstration that would cope with the
relation between the knower and the external objective world known by him.
(Consider Thomas, *Quaestiones disputata de anima* I, art. 5, ad resp.)  Maybe
some of your other comments begin to come around to this. 

Merry Christmas,

Guy Story Brown, Dallas & LA
[email-masked]

---

From: "Robert B. Waltz" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 21 Dec 1997 13:46:36 -0600

FAIR WARNING: This has *nothing* to do with textual criticism, and
probably will never return to the subject. But I'm confused, and I'll
ask the question on-list in case others are, too.

On Sun, 21 Dec 1997, STORYBROWN <[email-masked]> wrote:

>Kantianism is open.

I wouldn't know anything about that. A good scientist stays away
from philosophy, lest it pollute his or her mind. :-)

(And don't tell me that that's a form of Russell's Paradox, because
it isn't -- quite.)

>The doctrine that knowledge begins with its own

I suppose I agree -- but I think I'm failing to understand this.
The problem of interaction between the observer and the observed
is well known (e.g. the Uncertainty Principle). There is also
the problem of correspondence between the internal and external
worlds -- but how can we solve *that* except by assuming some
sort of correlation. At least science displays an ability to
affect the perceived external world in a way that correlates with
our internal expectations.

My point was different. There are things science cannot measure --
e.g. the gravitational constant in another galaxy. We can't *get*
there to conduct the measurement. In that case, one must make
reasonable assumptions. They may be wrong -- but what are we
supposed to do, make *unreasonable* assumptions?

We always must make assumptions. The point is to know what we're
assuming. One might almost call science the task of documenting
our assumptions. :-)

-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-

                        Robert B. Waltz
                     [email-masked]

Want more loudmouthed opinions about textual criticism?
Try my web page: http://www.skypoint.com/~waltzmn
(A site inspired by the Encyclopedia of NT Textual Criticism)

---

From: Matthew Johnson <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 27 Dec 1997 00:34:47 -0800 (PST)

> ask the question on-list in case others are, too.

At the risk of appearing merely contrary, I ust express my vehement
disagreement.  It has much to do with Textual Criticism. However, I
suspect that most of the subscribers (at least those who are published
professional TCers) already understand the connection well enough that
this is a wast of time for them.  So your "fair warning" is appreciated. 

> >fairly garden variety Kantianism and subject to all the objections to which

I thought Kant would have known better.  This view does not even merit the
name "Kantianism", but is just a late 20th century regurgitation of
Logical Positivism. 

> from philosophy, lest it pollute his or her mind. :-)

Again, I must vehemently disagree.  The entire notion of "gauge theory",
which you _must_ know with your physics background, is due to a stellar
counterexample, Hermann Weyl, whose philosophical erudition overflows from
practically every one of his sentences in his classic "Group Theory and
Quantum Mechanics", which was THE book for working theoretical physicists
in both non-relativistic and relativistic Quantum Mechanics from 1932 when
it was published, to 1948 when Feynman's much simpler scattering wave
approach finally displaced Second Quantization and Hole Theory. 

I'll even dare conjecture that if Weyl _had_ become interested in NT TC,
he would not persist in trying to apply the methods of the experimental
physical sciences to philology! 

Nor was Weyl alone (among great physicists) in having such a thorough
classical education.  Bohr and Schroedinger also had excellent humanities
backgrounds before specializing in physics.  A little biographical
research on the other leading lights of quantum mechanics would surely
show that many others had such a background, since that was the _norm_ in
Europe before the War.  Of course this background included philosophy. 

> >some of your other comments begin to come around to this. 

It is refreshing to see that _someone_ else on this list appreciates
Aquinas's relevance even to modern day issues!

> is well known (e.g. the Uncertainty Principle).

But the Uncertainty Principle seems like such a _small problem_ when
compared to the problem of Quantum MEasurement!
> There is also
Even in the Bell Experiment?

> supposed to do, make *unreasonable* assumptions?

And this judgement, which assumptions are _reasonable_, is often highly
subjective, as when Dirac assumed that all negative energy levels were
occupied (La Theorie du Positron). 

Matthew Johnson
Waiting for the blessed hope and the appearance of the glory of our 
great God and Saviour Jesus Christ (Ti 2:13).